ARE BASIC SCIENCE AND BIOTECHNOLOGY COMPLEMENTARY ACTIVITIES? by Xia, Yin & Buccola, Steven T.
 
 








Selected Paper delivered at the American Agricultural Economics Association 




Yin Xia is a Ph.D. student and Steven Buccola a professor in the Department of Agricultural 
and Resource Economics, Oregon State University, Corvallis, OR 97331. 
The email addresses are:  xiay@ucs.orst.edu and steven.t.buccola@orst.edu, respectively. 
 
 
Copyright 2001 by Yin Xia and Steven Buccola.  All rights reserved.  Readers may make 
verbatim copies of this document for non-commercial purposes by any means, provided that 
this copyright notice appears on all such copies.   2 
Are Basic Science and Biotechnology Complementary Activities? 
  A decade ago, most U.S. farmers thought genetically modified seed was in their distant 
future.  Today, transgenic crops have substantial market share, including 50% of the corn, 45% 
of the cotton, and 60% of the soybeans grown in the United States.  The cost and environmental 
advantages of the pest and herbicide resistance in transgenic plant and animal material is only 
the beginning of the picture.  New generations of plant and animal tissue will embody novel 
product characteristics, enabling marketers to cater to specific demand profiles in ways 
unthinkable in the past.   These opportunities will revolutionize agricultural research, extension, 
production, and marketing.   
The revolution came about through a discrete jump in scientific knowledge.   Discovery 
of recombinant DNA in the 1950s and 1960s led, after a substantial incubation period, to 
practical protocols for transferring potentially useful genes from one organism to another.  The 
exploitation of these protocols soon led to patentable products, which found their way to 
market after years of field trials.  Applied agricultural research in the biotechnological era has 
become increasingly science-based, less dependent on trial-and-error than in earlier years 
(Narin, Hamilton, and Olivastro 1997; Mansfield 1995).  For example, a typical biotechnology 
patent document now cites an average of 15 to 20 scientific publications, an increase since even 
the mid-1990s and far higher than the one per patent document in non-biotech fields (CHI 
Research).  As Arora and Gambardella (1993, 1994) point out, this has tended to universalize 
the categories with which applied technology operates, fostering greater communication 
between researchers in related fields.  
  Implications of the new science-based technology growth are profound.  The enhanced 
research returns which recombinant DNA have made possible likely are responsible for much   3 
of the rise in R&D expenditures – and share of R&D in total investment – in the agricultural 
input industries since the 1970s.  Just as importantly, the increasingly universal terms in which 
applied R&D can be conducted have enabled a greater division and specialization of research 
effort.  Once, that is, science has mapped the broad features of the biophysical terrain, 
technologists can more easily partition this space for more detailed prospecting, coordinating 
their efforts through the language of molecular biology (Paul, Mowery, and Steinmueller 
1992).   
The emergence of a common technological paradigm, like the rise of standardized 
commodity grade standards sixty years ago, is in turn facilitating the growth of a market-based 
research system.  Thus, the private sector’s share of agricultural research is growing rapidly 
(Fuglie, et al. 1995) and patent protection is granted for an ever-widening array of product and 
process innovations (Jaffe 1999).  The increasing ease of obtaining intellectual property 
protection, that is, can be viewed as an endogenous response to the increased ease of dividing 
innovation processes into sub-tasks, which stimulates the demand for transactions in 
intellectual property. 
The Issues 
  Specialization of agricultural R&D functions poses a challenge to economic analysis.  
Studies of the returns to public agricultural R&D traditionally have employed university 
research and extension expenditures as shift terms in a production or cost function of a class of 
farm commodities (Fuglie, et al. 1998; Huffman and Evenson 1995; Khanna, Huffman, and 
Sandler 1994; Alston, Norton, and Pardey 1993; Pardey and Craig 1989).  This approach 
exploited readily available data and permitted direct inferences about the social welfare effects 
of public expenditure decisions.  Furthermore, the concentration of research in public   4 
institutions obviated the need for explicit models of public-private relationships or of 
intellectual property issues.  With the science-based biotechnology revolution well underway, 
new approaches are needed.  Now, a clear understanding of the returns to public investment in 
agriculture requires a detailed examination of the relationship between basic and applied 
research and between public and private R&D.   
  In the present study, we focus on the manner in which public research inputs interact 
with those in the private sector to produce agricultural biotechnology innovations.  We are 
interested, that is, in the productivity of the public-private research enterprise, or in Arora and 
Gambardella's (1994) words, the “technology of technical change.”  Little explicit work has yet 
emerged on this subject in agricultural economics, although it was first broached forty years 
ago (Nelson 1959).  Since the late 1980s, interest in the subject has intensified, especially in 
regard to pharmaceutical biotechnology.  Some economists have focused on the 
conceptualization and measurement of research outputs, especially on the use of patent 
applications and awards as indicators of the quantity or value of research effort (Trajtenberg, 
Henderson, and Jaffe 1997; Zucker and Darby 1995).  A few have investigated incentive 
schemes for rewarding scientists’ efforts (Cockburn, Henderson, and Stern 1999; Stern 1999; 
Heller and Eisenberg 1998), while others have concentrated on knowledge accumulation as a 
dynamic process (Koo and Wright 1999; Aghion and Howitt 1992; Segerstrom, Anant, and 
Dinopoulos 1990). 
Identifying Information Flows 
    The technology of technical change is the process through which information 
inputs are transformed into information outputs; it is the study of information transformation.  
Information variables cannot be traced as easily as physical inputs are.  A researcher herself   5 
would have difficulty identifying every source of information or suggestion that led her to a 
particular insight.  However, because ideas are fruitful only in combination with related ones, 
they are best bundled in some form, such as in patent documents, books, and journal articles.  
Bundling of this nature implies it is feasible to identify some of the principal sources of a 
researcher’s inspiration and direction. 
Document bundling has its limits.  Scientists cannot put in writing everything they 
know about a genetic sequence on which they are working.  Part of their knowledge remains 
“tacit” and local in the sense that they can provide practical information about it only through 
continuous and personal communication.  As Zucker and Darby (1995), Jaffe, Trajtenberg, and 
Henderson (1993), and Stern (1999) have shown, this explains why start-up biotech companies 
tend to locate near universities.  It explains also why firms engaged primarily in applied 
research, field trials, and marketing also employ basic scientists.  Only by doing so can they 
develop the “absorptive” capacity” to evaluate and exploit prospective scientific breakthroughs 
(Nelson and Rosenberg 1994, Lim 1999, Rausser 1999).  More generally, a research unit’s 
human and physical capital influence the cost of exploiting the information sources available.  
Intellectual property is patentable only if it has a direct, useful application.  Most 
university bioscience research instead focuses on relatively abstract concepts, those which 
develop, refine, or test hypotheses that do not have immediate applications to goods or services.  
Thus, most university biological research has economic value, beyond its utility for teaching, 
only insofar as it affects the subsequent development of commercially viable intellectual 
property.  In the absence of patent protection, university research typically is best disseminated 
through publicly accessible media.  How these publications influence (spill over into) 
commercially valuable property rights, how subsequent commercial success spills back into 
basic science, and what university administrators can do to encourage a research that would   6 
best generate such complementarities, is therefore the frontier of work on the management of 
university biotechnology resources. 
Complementarity Between Applied and Basic Research 
  An information complementarity especially relevant to both the research administrator 
and industrial organization analyst is that potentially found between basic bioscience and 
applied biotechnology.  Just as science provides the technology lab with a general map of the 
biomolecular terrain, so do the successes and failures of a scientific insight to develop 
profitable products guide scientists in where next to look for fundamental insights.  Thus, the 
practical success of the DNA paradigm in generating marketable products has stimulated more 
scientific research on DNA.  For this reason, and as Rausser (1999) has discussed at some 
length, inputs allocated to applied research programs can enhance basic research, just as basic 
research insights facilitate technological development.   
Cockburn, Henderson, and Stern (1999) provide an example of this complementarity in 
the design of research incentives at large biotech firms.  They show that firms whose promotion 
systems weight an employee’s published or basic research highly tend also to be those which 
offer high budgetary rewards to departments with significant patent successes.  These firms 
tend to devolve decision-making power to departments, exploiting the complementarity 
between scientific and technological skill at the departmental level.  Other firms specialize or 
centralize, treating basic and applied science inputs as though competitive for the same set of 
resources.  Zucker, Darby, and Brewer (1998) demonstrate similarly that successful biotech 
start-up firms tend to concentrate in locales with the leading university bioscientists, since 
geographic proximity reduces the cost of exploiting the feedback between conceptual and 
patentable innovation.  The intensive merger and co-venture activity we now are witnessing in   7 
agricultural biotechnology arises from attempts to seek and exploit such complementarities, a 
process which continually exhausts some complementary relations and thus provides niches for 
more specialized firms (Brennan, Pray, and Courtmanche 1999; Kalaitzandonakes and Hayenga 
1999).  Public universities face similar choices between pursuing a broad or focused research 
activity. 
  A model addressing these issues must distinguish between inputs and outputs of both 
applied and basic research, allow the feedback essential to complementary relationships, and 
more generally permit both complementarity and substitutability among research programs.  
Oehmke et al.(1999), Falck-Zepeda, Traxler, and Nelson (1999), Koo and Wright (1999), and 
Moschini and Lapan (1997), among others, have developed dual models of optimal R&D 
investment in generally imperfectly competitive market structures.  Here, we focus instead on a 
primal model of knowledge production, stressing the relationship between applied and basic 
research. 
Conceptual Framework 
In a given time interval, let 
b I    be the quality-weighted number of bioscience innovations at a given university; 
a I    the quality-weighted number of agricultural biotechnological innovations linked 
to the bioscience innovations at the given university; 
b b L K ,    the quantity of capital and bioscientist FTE, respectively, employed in 
bioscience research at the given university;    8 
a a L K ,    the quantity of capital and biotechnologist FTE, respectively, employed in 
applied research at the university or institution producing the biotechnological 
innovations; 
univ X      the vector of fixed factors (including overhead and qualitative characteristics) of 
the university producing the bioscience innovations; and 
  firm X   the vector of fixed factors of the firm or university achieving the 
biotechnological innovations.  
The technology of biotechnological change might be specified as 
(1)   ) , , , ( firm b a a a a X I L K I I =  
(2)   ) , , , , ( univ a a b b b b X L K L K I I =  
where time subscripts and lag operators are, for notational simplicity, suppressed.  Equation (1) 
says the number of applied innovations in a given time interval depends on the quantity of 
capital and technologist FTE devoted to producing applied innovations, on the number of basic 
innovations which the biotech firm has the capacity to absorb, and on the biotech firm’s fixed 
factors and characteristics.  Variable  b I  in this equation reflects the scientific information 
guiding biotechnology development.  Equation (2) says the number of basic innovations 
depends on the quantity of capital and labor allocated to producing basic innovations, on the 
quantity of inputs allocated to applied research in that field, and on the university’s fixed 
factors and characteristics.  Applied inputs a a L K ,  in equation (2) represent the feedback from 
applied to basic science, because it is applied research efforts – including failures as well as 
successes – rather than marketable outputs that arguably influence the direction and success of 
basic research.     9 
Equations (1) and (2) form a schematic of the influence of university investments on 
commercial biotech outputs.  The university allocates scientist and capital inputs to its basic 
and applied biological research programs.  After the appropriate lags, these investments 
generate bioscience outputs b I  at a rate depending upon the university’s fixed factors such as its 
location, history, and overhead structure.  Biotech firms and universities exploit the science 
outputs by hiring capital, scientists, and technologists to develop them into patentable 
technological innovations.  Their success in doing so depends on their location, market 
strategies, fixed investment, and other characteristics.  In general, a society might wish to 
allocate public research inputs so as to maximize the long-run commercial value of patentable 
outputs.  Of course, such decisions in the United States are not centrally directed.  However, 
understanding the principal forces of agricultural biotechnological change can, under 
appropriate assumptions about private-sector market structure and behavior, provide useful 
guidance to public resource allocation. 
To simplify the exposition, suppose equation (1) is weakly separable in the partition 
) , ( ), , ( firm b a a X I L K and equation (2) in the partition  ) , ( b b L K , ) , ( a a L K , univ X .  The technology 
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applied and basic science, respectively, where the P’s are the associated prices.  Holding prices 
fixed, we can write (1) and (2) as 
(1′ )     ) , , ( firm b a a a X I E I I =  
(2′ )     ) , , ( univ a b b b X E E I I =  
The feedback from applied to basic, and from basic to applied science in the above 
equations form the essentials of a test of the hypothesis that the two enterprises are   10 
complementary with one another.  In the weakly separable model, for example, substitute (2′ ) 
into (1′ ) to obtain the reduced form 
(3′ )   ] , ) , , ( , [ firm univ a b b a a a X X E E I E I I =    
        =    ) , , , ( firm univ b a a X X E E I   
This form is especially useful if consumer welfare is thought to depend only on applied 
innovations. 
Complementarities and Spill-Ins 
If  firm univ X X ,  are held fixed, the total differential of (3′ ) is 





































   
Often, research administrators would operate under a budget restriction  b a
o E E B + = , 
implying (3′ ) can be written as ) , , ( firm univ b a a X X S I I = , where
o
b b B E S / = is the budget share 
allocated to basic research.  The restriction implies  b a dE dE − = .  Substituting the latter into 
(4) and dividing by  b dE  gives total derivative 






































  Allocating another scarce dollar to basic bioscience reduces the money available for 
applied research.  This has the direct effect – shown in the first right-hand term (5) – of 
reducing the output rate of applied biotech innovations.  In addition, as reflected in  a b E I ∂ ∂ / , it 
reduces the rate of bioscience innovation to the extent that applied research activity, which the 
budget cutback has retarded, stimulates successful basic science.  Through  b a I I ∂ ∂ / , this   11 
reduction feeds back into a lower rate of applied innovation.  On the other hand, the extra dollar 
spent on bioscience research increases basic science output by amount  b b E I ∂ ∂ /,   increasing the 
rate of applied output by way of the positive influence ( a b I I ∂ ∂ / ) of basic research on applied 
innovations.  Equation (5) is positive, that is shifting money from applied to basic science 
increases the rate of applied biotech innovations, if () () b b b a E I I I ∂ ∂ ∂ ∂ / /  exceeds 
() ( ) a b b a a a E I I I E I ∂ ∂ ∂ ∂ + ∂ ∂ / / /  in absolute value.  This will occur only if the impact 
b b E I ∂ ∂ / of basic science expenditures on basic science outputs is especially large.  Arguably, 
that has been the case in recent decades. 
It is useful to distinguish between bioscience’s partial and total effect on 
biotechnological innovations.  The partial complementarity,  b a I I ∂ ∂ / , of basic with applied 
research presumably is positive because scientific insight is a partial substitute for 
technological effort.  But total complementarity  b a dI dI /  is positive only if (5) is, since only 
then do a I  and  b I both rise as science expenditures b E do.  That is, in the present formulation, 
basic and applied research outputs are complementary only if both rise as the research budget is 
exogenously reallocated toward basic science.  Diagrammatically, the reallocation represents a 
movement along a production possibility frontier in which the two output possibilities are 
published science and patentable innovations and in which the total research budget is held 
constant.  Complementarity prevails where the frontier has positive slope.  Essentially, 
bioscience in these zones acts more as an input to than as a co-output with biotechnology.  In a 
world of decreasing returns, decision makers push beyond such complementarity zones and 
operate where outputs substitute for one another.  But in the presence of agglomeration or 
network economies, or where the supply function of productive scientists slopes upward,   12 
administrators might rationally operate where basic and applied research are complements 
(Rausser 1999).  
The sample variation necessary for estimating aggregate model (1) and (2) or (1′ ) and 
(2′ ) is provided by inter-year and inter-university differences in research budgets and 
productivity.  An aggregate production function of this sort differs from conventional ones in 
which inputs are rival and tradable.  Here, a firm buys science information at zero market price 
(because it is publicly available in journals), but at a shadow cost equaling the resources 
expended to evaluate and exploit the information.  Such a cost is a function of the firms’ fixed 
investments in market position, location, and science know-how.  Hence, our model will reflect 
a weighted average of individual firms’ and universities’ knowledge-creation technologies.  
Nevertheless, it can readily by used to draw inferences about the impacts of individual 
university and biotech firm characteristics.  Commercial, Patent Office, and university data 
bases offer information on many of the shift variables represented above by univ X  and  firm X  , 
including unit size, overhead expenditure, geographic location, and specialization.  These can 
be used to test hypotheses about the principal factors affecting scientific output, 
biotechnological innovation, and the synergy between them.  
Empirical Model 
  Drawing a clear line between what is “basic” and what is “applied,” either in patented 
innovations or in publications, is difficult.  Furthermore, both private firms and universities 
conduct both types of research.  Nevertheless, most agricultural biotechnology patents are 
awarded to the private sector and most basic scientific research is conducted in universities.  
And, as discussed above, biotech firms pursue basic research primarily to enhance their   13 
absorptive capacity for evaluating and using scientific research published in the public sector 
(Lim 1999).  For this reason, we will assume that private-sector expenditures are intended 
primarily to produce patentable innovations, and will ignore scientific publications of private-
sector employees unless they are also university employees.  In contrast, universities’ non-
overhead expenditures often can be divided between their applied and basic research programs. 
Consistent with most of the recent literature, we will use patent awards as our measure 
of applied research output (Aghion and Howitt 1992; Harhoff, Narin, Scherer, and Vopel 1999; 
Henderson, Jaffe, and Trajtenberg 1998) and published scientific articles as our measure of 
basic research output (Lim 1999).  The strengths and weaknesses of these measures have been 
discussed extensively (e.g. Cockburn, Henderson, and Stern 1999).  Patents represent the end of 
a discovery phase in the development of either a research process or a candidate seed or 
compound.  Many of these discoveries perform unsuccessfully in the subsequent field- or 
clinical-trial phase of R&D, or even if they are successful there, prove later to be commercially 
unprofitable.  On the other hand, patent awards can also understate productivity inasmuch as 
some biotech firms – especially larger ones – retain certain discoveries as trade secrets, 
developing and marketing them on their own rather than patenting and licensing them to other 
entities.  The U.S. Patent Office requires a patent document to list the patented inventions 
which the discovery has utilized, since permission must be obtained from the owners of these 
patents before the invention in question can be commercially exploited.  Thus, a frequent way 
of accounting for patent quality is to weight each patent by the number of subsequent patents 
which cite it (Trajtenberg, Henderson, and Jaffe 1997; Lerner 1994).  Scientific publications 
can be quality-weighted in similar fashion, namely by accounting for the number of times they 
are cited in subsequent publications.   14 
  With the above considerations in mind, our empirical model will take the following 
general form.  Let 
it j A ,    be the number of bioscience publications authored by the j
th scientist at the i
th 




τ   be the number of agricultural biotechnology patents awarded in the τ
th year 
which cited a publication authored by the j
th scientist at the i
th university in the 
t
th year; 
τ r be the discount rate in the τ
th year. 
We can then define the magnitude of scientific innovations at the i
th university in the t
th year as 
(6)     ∑ =
j
it j it b A I , ,  
that is, the unweighted sum of its scientists’ journal publications.  The magnitude of 
biotechnological innovations subsequently linked to authors at the i
th university in the t
th year is 
(7)   ∑∑ + =
j
it j
it a r P I
τ
τ τ ) 1 ( /
,
,  
that is, the time-discounted number of patent citations in year τ  to the j
th scientist’s year-t 
publications, summed over years τ  = t+1, …, Tτ   following publication, then summed over all 
J
it authors at the i
th university in the t
th year.   
Quality-Weighting the Research Outputs 
  We can vary these definitions in such a way that each publication and patent is 




'   as the number of times in the t´
th year that a scientific article cites the m
th 
publication in the t
th year of the j






τ  as the number of times in the τ ´
th year that a patent document cites the n
th patent 
awarded in the τ
th year which had cited a scientific article authored by the j
th 
scientist at the i
th university in the t
th year. 
The first definition allows us to specify a quality-weighted measure of the magnitude of 
scientific innovations at the i
th university in the t
th year, namely 








t it b r C I + = ∑∑∑   
In (6′ ), Σ m is the number of times the j
th scientist was cited in the t´
th year for articles he 
published in the t
th year.  Σ t´ Σ m is the number of times this scientist was eventually cited for all 
articles he published in the t
th year.  Summing the latter over all J
it scientists at the i
th university 
gives that university’s t
th-year scientific output in terms of the number of times any article 
published from that university in that year was subsequently cited.   
The second definition above allows us in similar fashion to specify a quality-weighted 
measure of the magnitude of agricultural biotechnological innovations linked to scientists at the 
i
th university in the t
th year. The measure is 
(7′ )   ∑∑∑∑ + =
jn
jit n
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In (7′ ), Σ n is the number of times in the τ ´
th year that any patent cited an earlier patent awarded 
in the τ
th year which had cited the jit
th publication.  Summing over all years τ ´ gives the total 
number of times that any patent cited a τ
th –year patent which in turn had cited the jit
th 
publication.  Summing again over all years τ  gives the time-discounted number of patents that   16 
ultimately referenced the jit
th publication, and Σ j sums this number over all scientists at the i
th 
university in the t
th year.  Measure (7′ ) reflects a given university’s effectiveness in generating 
scientific publications which will be cited in highly-cited patents.  In certain circumstances 
other quality-weighting procedures might be more appropriate and can easily be developed 
with the present tools. 
  In the context of this research, unweighted measure (6) of a university’s scientific 
output is not as naive as it might appear.  Estimating equation (1) even with unweighted 
variables (6) and (7) constitutes a way of judging the quality of a university’s bioscience 
publications, because it estimates the effectiveness of those publications in producing 
patentable innovations.  Employing weighted measure (6′ ) for such purpose instead is a way of 
answering the question:  Does weighting a scientist’s publications by the volume of their 
subsequent literature citations improve our ability to forecast the effectiveness of those articles 
in generating patentable biotechnology innovations?  Preliminary evidence suggests it does.  
That is, bioscience publications highly cited in patent documents tend also to be highly cited in 
the publicly accessible scientific literature (CHI Research). 
Econometric Estimation 
  We can now specify econometrically estimable versions of (1) and (2) or (1′ ) and (2′ ).  
Employing weakly separable form (1′ ) and (2′ ), for example, in conjunction with unweighted 
measure (6) of bioscience output and weighted measure (7′ ) of the patents linked to them, gives 
(1′′ )   ) , , (
*
, , , ,
i
firm it b i a it a it a X I I I
! Ε =    i  =  1, …, I ;   t  =  1, …, T 
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! ! =    i  =  1, …, I ;   t  =  1, …, T   17 
where
!
i a, Ε  is a weighted average of the applied technology expenditures at the firms receiving 
patents which cited a scientist at the i
th university,
i
firm X  is the set of characteristics of these 
firms,
!
i a E ,  are applied technology expenditures at the i
th university, and !superscripts indicate 
the appropriate lags.  University applied technology expenditures would reasonable include 
outreach expenditures.  The sample frame in this model consists of annual observations on the 
bioscience inputs and publications of a set of universities, and of the patent outputs, expenses, 
and characteristics of the set of firms which used those publications in their applied 
biotechnology programs.  The model can be estimated with standard simultaneous equations 
methods. 
One might expect the econometric results to indicate that complementarity between 
bioscience and biotechnology is greater in large universities than in small ones.  The 
communication essential for synergy between basic and applied research usually is less costly 
within than between organizations (Zucker and Darby 1998).  Because fixed costs of molecular 
biology research are high, returns to size in biotechnology R&D probably are increasing in 
output.  If so, large universities can operate both basic and applied research programs more 
cheaply than can small universities, and hence take advantage of the low cost of in-house 
communication between the two programs.  This simply is a variant of the argument that size 
provides agglomeration economies.  On the other hand, recent breakthroughs in remote 
communication technology may have eliminated these size advantages:  scientists working in 
the same sub-field at two different universities may communicate more easily with one another 
than do two scientists in less related fields at the same university.  In any event, we would 
expect university bioresearch to be more complementary with the biotechnology at small start-
up firms than with that at larger firms such as Novartis, since start-up firms’ physical proximity   18 
and ownership connections with university scientists should enhance the communication of 
tacit knowledge (Zilberman, Yarkin, and Heiman 1999).   
Apart from permitting tests of these hypotheses, our results will provide a basis for 
university decision-making in both the short and long run.  The short-run issue is how to 
allocate annual university expenditures between applied and basic science.  The long-run issue 
is how to design the university’s research strategy given the university’s location and other 
fixed features. 
Data 
The data for the econometric model divides into research outputs (patents and scientific 
papers) and inputs to the research process.  To derive observations on the research output data, 
we draw a large sample of agricultural biotechnology patents from the United States Patent 
Office database and observe the identity of the awarded firms or other institutions and the 
scientific publications cited on the patent documents. We then identify the authors of those 
publications and the universities or labs at which they worked at time of publication.  Because 
of the tedium of determining ag-biotech patents, discriminating between science and non-
science references on a patent, and matching alternative forms of a scientist’s or a firm’s 
names, we hire CHI Research of Haddon Heights, New Jersey to conduct the above data search 
and cleaning process for this study.  Finally, from other sources, including NSF and the Bureau 
of Census, we collect data on the research input allocations at the identified firms and 
universities, such as the R&D expenditures and technologists’ and scientists’ FTEs, and match 
them with the research outputs at the same institutions, taking account of the requisite lag 
structure.   
  Consider, for example, a case in which a bioscience article listed in a given patent 
document was authored by two scientists, one at university i and the other at university i´.    19 
Upon encountering this article, we increment unweighted measures  it a I ,  and  t i a I ' ,  of applied 
biotechnology output by one unit each.  If quality-weighted measures
*
, it a I  , 
*
' , t i a I  are to be used 
instead of unweighted ones, these unit increments are replaced with the number of times the 
given patent was cited in subsequent patents.  We then increment unweighted measures it b I ,  
and t i b I ' , of basic bioscience output by one unit each if the indicated article had not earlier been 
counted as part of that university’s science output in year t.  That is, in the unweighted 
bioscience output measure, the fact of being cited in at least one patent qualifies a publication 
to be counted once, and only once, as part of the i
th and i´
th universities’ science output in year 
t.  If quality-weighted measures 
*
, it b I  of bioscience output are to be used instead of unweighted 
ones, that unitary observation is replaced with the number of times the article was cited in 
subsequent scientific articles.  The indicated output variables are then matched to the respective 
research inputs 
i
univ i a i b X E E , , , ,
! !  at the i
th and i′
th universities and to inputs 
!
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